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SIS, Grigori Tokaev, and the London Controlling Section: New 
perspectives on a Cold War defector and Cold War deception 
 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Grigori Aleksandrovich Tokaev defected to British intelligence officers in 
Germany in October 1947. He was the first senior Soviet official to do so, and was codenamed 
EXCISE. His defection occurred when Britain was struggling to gather significant intelligence on the 
USSR, and when Soviet propaganda was increasing in its volume and ferocity.1 British officials 
attempted to use him to remedy both problems. Tokaev was an experienced aeronautical engineer 
who, prior to his defection, had worked in the Zukov Military/Air Academy, served as the Joint 
General Secretary of the Russian section of the allied secretariat in Germany, and the Air Force 
Department of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany; the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or 
MI6) and the Security Service (MI5) debriefed him thoroughly, believing that his intelligence could 
provide valuable insights into Stalin’s strategic weapons programmes.2 Later, the Information 
Research Department (IRD), Britain’s propaganda outfit, attempted to use his defection and his 
writings to undermine morale in the Soviet armed forces and encourage others to defect.3 The 
significance of his academic expertise and his subsequent public profile in Britain ensured that his 
case has received a significant amount of scrutiny, much of it critical. Recently released files, 
however, indicate that his role was broader than hitherto understood. SIS and the IRD were not the 
only agencies interested in Tokaev; he also attracted Britain’s enigmatic deception planners in the 
London Controlling Section (LCS). The new material illustrates how Tokaev interacted with the LCS, 
and how the LCS attempted to use Britain’s prized defector when planning and implementing its 
schemes. This note offers fresh insights into Tokaev’s defection and into the extremely secretive 
world of Cold War strategic deception.  
 
Tokaev and deception in Cold War historiography 
There is a stark contrast between the historical prominence of Tokaev and the relative absence of 
deception from the historiography of the Cold War.4 The former was subject to significant publicity 
                                                                 
1 W. K. Wark ‘Coming in from the Cold: British Propaganda and Red Army Defectors, 1945 -1952’, The 
International History Review 9 (1987), p.48. 
2 P Maddrell, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961 (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p.70. 
3 See Wark ‘Coming in from the Cold’. 
4 As Andrew Defty presents, the IRD publicised his case in The Times, The Sunday Express, and on the BBC. A. 
Defty Britain, America, and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945-53 (London, Frank Cass, 2003) p.191. Tokaev 
features in several studies of British intell igence and the Soviet strategic threat, as well as British intelligence 
and Soviet defectors, e.g R. J. Aldrich British Intelligence Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51 (Hoboken, 
Routledge, 1992); B. Cole ‘British technical intelligence and the Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile 
threat, 1952-60’, Intelligence and National Security 14 (1999); H. Dylan, Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: 
Britain’s Joint Intelligence Bureau, 1945-1964 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014); P. Hoffman ‘The making 
of national estimates during the period of the ‘missile gap’, Intelligence and National Security 1 (1986). He also 
engaged in self-publicity, e.g. his G. A. Tokaev ‘Soviet Rocket Technology’ Technology and Culture 4 (1963). 
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and engaged in substantial self-publication almost from the moment of his defection. The IRD 
utilised Tokaev’s break with Stalin’s regime in its propaganda materials soon after his intelligence 
debrief. They sought to exploit his motives, particularly his abhorrence of the USSR’s policy of 
kidnapping German scientists, to encourage others to follow him.5 SIS exploited his story in secret, 
but managed to generate unwelcome publicity when, unauthorised, Tokaev and his SIS minder 
transported a defector from the American zone in Berlin back to Britain.6 Tokaev moved on to 
publish three books with the cooperation of his handlers, Stalin Means War, Betrayal of an Ideal, 
and Comrade X, and then pursued an academic career at Imperial College, Cranfield, Northampton, 
and City University of London.7 He died in 2003; national newspapers carried his obituary.8 
Tokaev’s profile as the first senior Soviet defector to Britain and his academic speciality all but 
ensured his case received considerable scrutiny amongst academics and journalists studying British 
intelligence. His knowledge of Soviet rocketry and strategic development arrived at a prescient time, 
when SIS, and British intelligence in general, struggled to penetrate Soviet institutions and 
communications.9 Despite his claim not to have offered SIS any information that would be 
considered a state secret in the USSR, research into his debriefing and its effect on British 
assessment indicates otherwise.10 For the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) he was a figure of 
considerable interest, a key window on the USSR in the nascent Cold War. In his official history of 
SIS, Keith Jeffery notes that Tokaev produced a great deal of intelligence ‘of varying quality’. 11 
Several other authors have expanded upon this in their studies of British scientific and technical 
intelligence and its influence on British policy. Tokaev’s intelligence included details of the conditions 
Soviet rocket scientists were forced to endure;12 the genesis of an indigenous Soviet guided rocket 
programme;13 the aims of that programme, and a scientific order-of-battle; and the importance the 
Soviets attached to adapting and developing their own version of the German V2 rocket.14 His 
intelligence had a significant impact on early Cold War British intelligence estimates of the Soviet 
strategic threat. 
Historians have, however, raised questions about the value of Tokaev’s contribution. They underline 
two particular problems with his intelligence. First, that it reinforced British preconceptions about 
the weakness of Soviet science. Second, that it placed undue emphasis on the re-engineering and 
development of German weapons in Soviet strategy. With regards the first issue, as Aldrich notes, 
despite the Soviets’ considerable technological achievements during the war, many in British 
intelligence harboured a level of contempt for Soviet scientists and their future potential that 
                                                                 
5 Wark ‘Coming in from the Cold’, p.59. 
6 K. Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949 (London, Bloomsbury, 2010), p.666. 
7 S. Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (London, Fourth Estate, 2000), p.148; N.West, Historical 
Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence (London, Scarecrow Press, 2007),p.345. 
8 See The Independent ‘Professor Grigory Tokati: Rocket scientist who denounced the Stalinist regime’, 25 
November, 2003. 
9 R.J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret intelligence Agency  (London, HarperPress, 
2010), pp.80-81. 
10 Dorril, MI6, p.148. 
11 Jeffery, MI6, p.666. 
12 R. J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray, 
2001), p.218. 
13 Dorril, MI6, p.146. 
14 Maddrell, Spying on Science, pp.70-77. 
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bordered on outright xenophobia. Tokaev’s reports of the manner in which Soviet scientists we re 
harassed by the security forces in concentration camp-like environments did little to change this, 
and belied their rapid progress in aeronautics and nuclear technologies.15 With regards the second, a 
number of scholars judge that Tokaev’s intelligence was misleading because he lacked insight into 
native Soviet research. The main proponents of this view are Paul Maddrell and Matthias Uhl.  In his 
detailed critique of Tokaev’s contribution, Maddrell notes  that both problems led to mistaken 
assessments, an underestimation of the Soviets’ rate of progress, and several shocks. He judges that 
much of Tokaev’s material was hearsay, but ‘accurate hearsay.’16 The Soviets certainly wished to 
develop the V2, but, contrary to Tokaev’s information, they also prioritised developing a capability to 
strike their enemy’s homelands. This requirement was put to Soviet scientists in March 1947, and 
they developed novel designs to meet the challenge by developing intercontinental ballistic 
missiles.17 Tokaev, based as he was in Germany, seems not to have been aware of this; as Maddrell 
argues, he ‘encouraged his debriefers to underestimate the USSR’s missile engineers.’ 18 Although he 
supplied intelligence on the general direction of Soviet research, he misled Britain as to its precise 
trajectory.  
Britain’s deception organisation was reformed for the nuclear age at about the same time as 
Tokaev’s defection, but has enjoyed a markedly different historical profile. 19 The LCS, and the 
strategic deception machinery, had only barely avoided wholesale dissolution at the end of the 
Second World War. Only three officers remained in 1946. However, following Sir Henry Tizard’s 
report on the future of warfare it was revived, refitted for the Cold War, and went on to plan and 
implement a number of creative deceptions across the globe. It is only comparatively recently that 
historians have been able to begin tracing the development of this organisation and its activities. 
Glimpses into its work are visible in certain texts on British nuclear history: Cathcart, for example, in 
1994 noted that the first British nuclear test was accompanied by a deception operation.20 But even 
at the turn of the millennium leading historians of British intelligence lacked precise details of the 
London Controlling Section or its successor, the Directorate of Forward Plans (DFP); all but a 
fragment of its activities remained unknown.21 
Our understanding of deception in the Cold War remains rather fragmentary: we have insights into 
some organisational issues, some specific atomic operations, and some of the work of the LCS and 
DFP in Britain’s end of empire struggles. But deception has generally been examined in the context 
of broader intelligence and military activity, rather than as a specific, specialised activity. Several 
                                                                 
15 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp.218-219. 
16 Maddrell, Spying on Science, p.70. 
17 Ibid, p.72. 
18 Ibid. 
19 British deception in the Second World War has, of course, received extensive and authoritative examination, 
see M. Howard, British intelligence in the Second World War: Vol. 5: Strategic Deception  (HMSO, London, 
1990). 
20 B. Cathcart, Test of Greatness: Britain’s Struggle for the Atomic Bomb (John Murray, London, 1994), p.174. 
For more on this operation see H. Dylan, ‘Operation Tigress: Deception for counterintell igence and Britain’s 
1952 atomic test’, Journal of Intelligence History 14 (2015). 
21 R. J. Aldrich, Espionage, Security, and Intelligence in Britain, 1945-1970 (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 1998); Aldrich The Hidden Hand; P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders Since 1945  
(Penguin, London, 2000); P. Hennessy, Having it So Good: Britain in the Fifties (Penguin. London, 2007). The 
most comprehensive study of the organisation of deception in the early post war years is J. Lewis, Changing 
Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-47 (London, Frank Cass, 2003). 
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factors account for this, some contemporary and some historical. Foremost amongst them is official 
secrecy. The vast majority of the LCS and DFP’s Cold War files remain under lock and key. In 2010, 
according to The National Archive’s catalogue, only nine files of the DEFE 28 series  – where LCS and 
DFP documents are stored – were available; in 2005 there were six. Today the file descriptions for 
the entire series are available, but the overwhelming majority of operational records remain 
retained by the Ministry of Defence.22  
Circumventing current official secrecy by examining other departments’ records is also problematic 
as deception operations in the 1940s and 1950s were, unsurprisingly,  exceedingly secret even by the 
standards of Britain’s secret state. Knowledge was limited to only a handful of officials and very few 
documents on proposed or ongoing operations were circulated. From the earliest days of its Cold 
War existence the LCS and its superiors stressed the requirement to keep distribution as tight as 
possible. The JIC minutes that deal with deception policy, management, and organisations were 
retained in a confidential annex, and the subject was noted in the agenda as simply ‘Poli cy for a 
Certain Organisation’.23   General Leslie Hollis, chair of ‘the Hollis Committee’, established to manage 
deception policy, reprimanded his officials sharply when they sent him a copy of the agenda for the 
Committee’s first meeting with an explicit description of the LCS's activities. ‘I cannot possibly 
circulate an agenda with all this open reference to “Deception”, “Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 
and “The Spread of Communism”’, he noted, adding ‘you have no idea how many people will start 
making enquiries. If you must issue an agenda, each item must be under a completely innocuous 
heading which will invite no interest from anyone other than those who know something about this 
business.’24 His instructions appear to have been followed. The Director’s name was omitted from 
Chiefs of Staff (COS) agendas and forecasts ‘for security reasons.’25 And ‘all reference to strategic 
deception plans, operations or any statement from which the existence of plans, etc., or their 
methods of implementation could be inferred’ was graded ‘top secret.’26 Indeed, the deception 
staff’s documentary anonymity was such that certain officials, unfamiliar with the conventions, 
wondered whether or not the deception planners had actually been invited to Chiefs of Staff 
Committee meetings, prompting the Committee Secretary, Ronald. W. Ewbank, to quote Walter 
Scott’s Marmion in frustration:27  
‘Oh! What a tangled web we weave,  
when first we practice to Deceive.’ 
 
In short, because of the security surrounding deception after the war historians have had remarkably 
few leads to follow. 
 
Recent documentary releases (some prompted by freedom of information requests) afford us the 
opportunity to begin redressing this historiographical imbalance and offer us a new perspective on 
                                                                 
22 This is based on the ‘record opening date’ fi ltering facil ity that is available on The National Archive 
catalogue. See http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/search/advanced-search. 
23 The National Archives (TNA) DEFE 28/76, Gleadell to JIC and Secretary JPS, 2 July 1947. 
24 TNA, DEFE 28/76, Hollis to Saunders, 19 September 1947. 
25 TNA, CAB 121/110, Ewbank ‘Attendance of Director of Forward Plans and Chiefs of Staff Meetings’, 28 
January 1953.  
26 TNA, CAB 121/110, ‘Office Note: Directorate of Forward Plans’, undated.  
27 TNA, CAB 121/110, Ewbank ‘Attendance of Director of Forward Plans and Chiefs of Staff Meetings’, 28 
January 1953. 
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deception and Tokaev’s Cold War role. They illustrate how SIS and the LCS worked to use Tokaev’s 
intelligence to devise more effective deceptions against Stalin’s USSR, and offer insights into many of 
the techniques at the deceivers’ disposal in the late 1940s. They reveal an organisation working in 
extremely difficult conditions, against a powerful and secretive enemy, and reinforce the judgement 
that Tokaev, despite his value as a prominent defector, was often difficult to manage and exploit. 28 
 
Tokaev, SIS, and the London Controlling Section 
The existing historiography outlines various aspects of Tokaev’s defection to Britain and his 
subsequent work. The records of the Permanent Undersecretary outline details of Tokaev’s debriefs, 
and the evolution of his propaganda role.29 Files from the DEFE 28 series add colour and detail on 
some of this, but also reveal entirely new perspectives. They reveal that the defector was in close 
contact with the deception machinery relatively soon after his defection; they cast a little more light 
on how he was managed; they cast light on the work he performed for the Foreign Office and SIS, 
and how various organisations evaluated his usefulness; they reveal the Soviets’ attempts to 
discredit him; and they reveal how he was included in various aspects of operational planning for the 
London Controlling Section’s strategic deceptions. It is clear that, just like the broader intelligence 
and foreign policy machinery, the LCS was desperately lacking of detailed insights into the USSR in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, and that this was a significant impediment to planning and 
implementing effective operations. Tokaev, for all his problems, was a considered a potentially 
valuable asset to the organisation at a difficult time.  
Tokaev defected with deep contempt for Stalin’s USSR and in fear for his life. During his time in 
Germany, when he was tasked with acquiring and exploiting German scientific and engineering 
advances, particularly jet engines, he had become concerned about the manner in which the Soviet 
authorities were treating German scientists. He claimed to have been in contact with several émigré 
organisations. By 1947 several of his co-conspirators had been arrested and he believed the Soviet 
security authorities were hunting him. He attempted to defect to the Canadians, but was channelled 
towards the British.30 SIS welcomed him. He was flown from Berlin to London, and put under the 
charge of Wilfred ‘Biffy’ Dunderdale’s Special Liaison Centre (SLC), based at Ryder Street in London.31  
The SLC was something of an anomaly in SIS’s organisational architecture. It was part of the 
‘production’ side of the Service, and is described by Jeffery as ‘the rump of Biffy Dunderdale’s 
wartime empire and embodied his carefully nurtured liaison arrangements begun with the prewar 
French and later adding the Polish intelligence service.’ It was ‘an operation with a “highly 
specialised staff of Russian-speakers, mostly of Russian Origin” engaged in collecting, processing and 
distributing Russian-language material, some of which was provided by the Poles.’32 According to 
                                                                 
28 A limited insight into Tokaev’s work with the LCS is available in H. Dylan, ‘Super -weapons and Subversion: 
British deterrence by deception operations in the early Cold War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38 (2015).  
29 See TNA FO 1093/548 and FO 1903/549. 
30 TNA FO 1093/551, ‘ A study of defectors from the USSR’ August 1948. 
31 Dorril, MI6, p.147. 
32 Jeffery, MI6, p.625. 
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Davies, soon after the war the SLC was involved in coordinating partisan operations in the Baltics. 33 
By 1947 it also handled suitable defectors.34 
Tokaev was significant to several British intelligence and propaganda organisations. But as time 
passed the matter of handling him became something of a fraught issue. He was of great interest to 
the LCS from the outset, and they considered him an asset for longer than many other agencies. 
Indeed, by March 1950, as SIS’s counterintelligence department, R.5, started to lose interest in 
Tokaev, the deception organisation attempted to adopt him. Col . Noel Wild wrote to Dunderdale 
stressing that an officer of the LCS (whose name is redacted from the documents, but who may be a 
Mr A. Chelley) ‘played a conspicuous part in the handling of Excise ever since 1947, and still 
continues to be the main link not only from a language point of view, but as someone in whom 
Excise has complete confidence and is ready to confide in. It is suggested therefore that [***] should 
continue in this role and so that Excise can come more directly under his control, administration 
should be switched from R.5 to L.S.C. [sic.]’35 Other departments may have also attempted to poach 
Tokaev. Dorril notes that he was ‘passed on’ to the IRD once he was debriefed for his knowledge of 
Soviet missiles.36  
It appears, however, that he was only ever seconded to other departments, and that SIS and SLC 
kept their hand on the tiller for the duration of Tokaev’s time as a major intelligence and 
propaganda asset. When Tokaev’s missile intelligence and counter-intelligence value was considered 
exhausted, late in 1950, his sole stream of income from the secret services still f lowed from the SLC. 
SIS’s A.2 noted in December 1950 that ‘C.S.S. agrees to a salary of up to [***] f.o.t. contingent on not 
less than six-monthly reviews. Subject should be given to understand that he is encouraged to 
become as self-supporting as possible by his writing, and that his emoluments from us will be 
subject to adjustment according to the extent of his earnings.’  Tokaev was to be ‘paid through the 
S.L.C’s budget and to all intents and purposes regarded as an S.L.C. Agent. The work in which he is 
engaged as Consultant and Adviser on Russian Affairs, will be handled by S.L.C.’ ‘Even if the efforts of 
subject may be made use of by Col. Wild’s office [the LCS] or I.R.D., subject will not receive any pay 
other than that through S.L.C.’37  
Despite being under SIS’s control Tokaev was consulted by several agencies. He supplied SIS and the 
Foreign Office with detailed descriptions of Soviet forces in Germany, including profiles of senior 
                                                                 
33 P. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London, Frank Cass, 2004), p.206. 
34 Dorril, MI6, p.147. 
35 Curiously, and somewhat confusingly, the relevant document contains what appears to be two typing 
mistakes that make discerning the message somewhat problematic. The document contains two references to 
the ‘LSC’. This, of course, could be a miss -typed reference to the LCS, the London Controlling Section, or the 
SLC, the Special Liaison Committee. The context suggests that it is  the former: first, the note is authored by 
Noel Wild, an officer at the LCS. Second, the argument is that a transfer of responsibility would benefit the 
deception organisation. TNA, DEFE 28/182, Wild to Dunderdale, ‘EXCISE’, 29 March 1950. The identificat ion of 
Chelley as Tokaev’s handler is not certain; it is based on his presence at meetings with Tokaev, and the odd 
reference, for example ‘That a small working part or planning team composed of Colonel Wild, [redacted, but 
probably Dunderdale], Mr. Drew and Major Kirby, be formed; this team should of course have the assistance 
of Mr A. Chelley and refer to Excise , as required.’ TNA, DEFE 28/102 House Party meeting, 23 March 1949.  
36 Dorril, MI6, p.147. 
37 TNA, DEFE 28/182, A.2. Minute 741 (Based on ACSS minute 727), 20 December 1950. 
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Soviet officers, and had advised them on how to induce other officers to defect.38 The 
counterintelligence officers at R.5 appear to have been very interested in his knowledge. He was also 
consulted regularly about political and military developments in the USSR, his views sought on the 
implications of the rise and fall of particular Communist politicians and functionaries.39 The JIC had 
been influenced by his intelligence about the development of Soviet missiles and aircraft, as well as 
a ‘scientific order of battle on Soviet long-range rocket research’; Maddrell judges that he gave 
‘some insight’ into the USSR’s armaments policy and ‘confirmed that a transformation of Soviet 
armaments had been launched’, one focused on acquiring or developing the highest technology. 40 
He also aided future British and American intelligence gathering ventures by suggesting the rough 
location of the Kapustin Yar missile test range.41 His intelligence underlined the value of defectors 
and was doubtlessly a significant factor in the JIC’s adopting a policy  late in 1948 of inducing 
defections.42 Initially, the IRD considered Tokaev a propaganda boon. They used his insights in 
pamphlets circulated to British embassies designed to help them hone their counters to Soviet 
propaganda, and published some of his writings warning of Soviet aggressive intentions. 43 But it is 
clear that by 1951 SIS was content that it had gained all that it could from Tokaev, and that in some 
respects he was proving rather troublesome. 
He was impulsive, often supplying hearsay (although in several cases, accurate hearsay), and 
managed to cause at least two quasi diplomatic incidents. The first, in the spring of 1948, involved 
the unauthorised commandeering of a British military aircraft and a journey to Germany to 
encourage the defection of an acquaintance, a Russian Colonel, J. D. Tasoev. He defected,  returned 
to the UK, then promptly repented and returned, much to the fury of the Soviets, the Foreign Office, 
the JIC, and the Security Service.44 The second, in September of that year, involved a press 
conference where the IRD had intended to introduce Tokaev to the world as a defector . It ‘turned 
into a near brawl between British officials and Russian journalists.’45  
Tokaev’s occasionally difficult character and questionable objectivity were tolerable in the early 
years of his defection. (His early handlers commented on his state of mind and ‘our difficulties in 
handling him’ as early as February 1948.’ Others noted their worry that he was ‘becoming a little 
unbalanced’.)46 But over time various departments steadily downgraded his usefulness. R.5. 
considered that ‘from a purely intelligence aspect, Excise has no further value’ in March 1950; 47 the 
Northern Department of the Foreign Office considered Tokaev’s assessments problematic by the 
same year, noting that ‘our general impression has been that due to the idiosyncrasy of his personal 
and national temperament EXCISE is inclined to romanticise and to claim “inside information” which 
                                                                 
38 See TNA,  FO 1093/548, ‘EXCISE’ Report on ‘SMA’, 6 February 1948; ‘EXCISE’ ‘Colonel Tyulpanoc’, 2 February 
1948. 
39 TNA, DEFE 28/112, LCS to Stewart Menzies, 9 March 1950; DEFE 28/182, Memo 112, ‘Changes in the 
Politburo’, 6 April  1949; DEFE 28/182, Memo 116, ‘Soviet Leaders’, 8 April  1949.  
40 Maddrell, Spying on Science, pp.70-1. 
41 Ibid, p.74. 
42 Ibid,p.76-7. 
43 Dorril, MI6, p.148. 
44 Jeffery, MI6, p.666. 
45 Dorril, MI6, p.148. 
46 TNA, FO 1093/548, note to Halford, 12 February, 1948; minute to Halford, 14 February 1948.  
47 TNA, DEFE 28/112, Wild to Dunderdale, ‘EXCISE’, 29 March 1950. 
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we are not satisfied would have been available to an official of his standing.’48 By December 1950 SIS 
as a whole deemed him of little intelligence value and was only willing to commit to maintaining his 
salary subject to six-monthly reviews.49  
Why keep him on at all? Some people in SIS saw little reason to do so. Wild could note in 1950 that 
several officers were content ‘that there is no further intelligence value to be derived from him, and 
therefore no reason to keep him “sweet”…’50 But three factors seem to have been crucial in the 
decision to maintain his financial support. The first was the (very low) potential that he might one 
day return to the USSR to make contact with former colleagues, and return to the UK with new 
intelligence. Tokaev had claimed on several occasions that he would be willing to undertake such a 
mission, although officers at the LCS and SIS appear to have considered this possibility rather 
fanciful. It was, in Wild’s judgement, a consideration that ‘needs profound exploration and thought, 
but should, nevertheless, not be dismissed lightheartedly.’51 The second factor was Tokaev’s 
lingering propaganda value. Despite his rather troublesome liaison with the IRD, the Soviets 
continued with their efforts to attempt to discredit him well into 1950. They planted stories in the 
British press, including in the Sunday Express, suggesting that he was a plant who had since re-
defected to the USSR with valuable intelligence about the British.52 Other articles questioned aspects 
of Tokaev’s comments on Soviet politics, specifically his allegations that Professor Otto Schimdt, an 
eminent scientist, appeared to have fallen out of Stalin’s favour and disappeared without a trace . 
Several SIS officers believed that these constituted a concerted effort to discredit him. They also 
considered it an excellent opportunity to retaliate, discern the purpose of the letters from the Soviet 
embassy, and develop more intelligence opportunities.53  
The third factor was Tokaev’s continued significance to the deception machinery at the London 
Controlling Section. His involvement with the deception planners appears to have begun soon after 
his defection. As is noted above, in the discussion over his management and pay, an officer from the 
LCS was one of his most trusted contacts since 1947.54 The relationship seems to have been 
productive for a longer period of time than that between Tokaev and SIS; the LCS still thought him a 
valuable asset in 1951. Why did the LCS maintain better relations with the defector over this time? 
After all, there can be little doubt that it was aware of the Foreign Office and SIS’s judgement about 
Tokaev’s reliability. The Foreign Office underlined its doubts about his analysis of current events in 
the USSR in 1950, noting with regard his conclusions that ‘it is impossible to write  them off, though 
the following comments seem to me to suggest that they are, at least, open to some doubt.’55 And 
they knew that SIS saw little reason even to, in their words, ‘keep him sweet’ by later that same 
year.56 As an officer noted to Sir Maurice Dean in June 1950, the LCS was under no illusion about 
their troublesome asset. 
                                                                 
48 TNA, DEFE 28/112, J. Y. Mackenzie (Northern Dpt, Foreign Office), 18 April  1950. 
49 TNA, DEFE 28/112, A.2. Minute 741 (Based on ACSS minute 727), 20 December 1950. 
50 TNA, DEFE 28/112, Wild to Dunderdale, ‘EXCISE’, 29 March 1950. 
51 Ibid. 
52 TNA, DEFE 28/112, Translation of paragraph entitled ‘Active military espionage’ 16 March 1950.  
53 TNA, DEFE 28/112, ‘Recent developments in the Tokaev Case’, Wild to ‘C’, 2 May 1950. 
54 TNA, DEFE 28/112, Wild to Dunderdale, ‘EXCISE’, 29 March 1950. 
55 TNA, DEFE 28/112, J. Y. Mackenzie (Northern Dpt, Foreign Office), 18 April  1950. 
56 TNA, DEFE 28/112, Wild to Dunderdale, ‘EXCISE’, 29 March 1950. 
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I do not find it altogether easy to make up my mind about this man. I think there is no doubt 
that he is a genuine defector with a genuine hatred of the regime, and that he has a wide 
knowledge of the cross currents in the Politburo and Central Committee circles. Such doubts 
as I have, arise from the difficulty of making sure that he is objective in the information he 
gives. He is opinionated and tends to ride particular hobbyhorses, and in using him it will be 
necessary to make some estimate of the “discount” factor to be applied to information of 
matters which obviously touch him closely.  57 
He went on to note that Tokaev was ‘a Caucasian whose mind obviously works quite different ly from 
that of the Westerner’, and that they were experiencing some not inconsiderable difficulty in 
persuading him to produce a statement of his views and proposals. But, nevertheless, that there was 
little doubt in his mind that Tokaev had a part to play in future develop operations against the Soviet 
world. As Dean noted: ‘He is after all the only individual we have at our disposal who has served in a 
position of some responsibility in the Russian central machine.’  58 
Tokaev had something valuable, something the LCS needed: insight. His defection occurred at a 
propitious time for the LCS. It had only recently been resurrected for the Cold War, having laid rather 
dormant since the end of the Second World War. It was devising a British deception strate gy, 
developing links with allies, and beginning to implement some schemes. Many of its early plans were 
extremely ambitious, no doubt betraying an optimism for the craft of deception nurtured during the 
previous war.59 It, however, found the Cold War environment and the Soviet Union a far more 
challenging adversary than Germany. Two particular problems stood out: first, it was having serious 
difficulties developing effective channels through which it could stream deceptive material into the 
USSR. As Noel Wild noted in 1948, ‘a very limited number of double agents have been started, but in 
each case they have terminated through one cause or another before any useful build up has been 
achieved’.60 The second was the lack of intelligence on practically all aspects of Soviet political and 
military organisations. Soviet security and counterintelligence was ruthless and effective, limiting the 
flow of humint to a trickle. Their communications security was also generally excellent. Despite 
several significant intrusions into Soviet cipher systems, notably the ‘Coleridge’ and ‘Longfellow’ 
systems, neither Britain nor its allies had sustained access to senior Soviet political discussions 
through sigint.61 This meant that they lacked information to plan deceptions, and that they lacked a 
feedback mechanism once a plan was implemented. Both factors had been crucial to the success of 
Second World War deception. Tokaev, the LCS believed, could be of value concerning the first 
problem. He could offer insights they could use to improve their plans. He could offer insights into 
Soviet strategic fears and anxieties. He could explain what certain political developments in the 
Kremlin meant for the individuals involved. He could begin explaining to the LCS what made the 
Soviets tick.  
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Tokaev and planning political deception operations 
 
The LCS consulted Tokaev on several aspects of the USSR’s political and cultural composition. It 
supplied him with questionnaires and its officers read his briefing notes on particular areas, 
personalities and developments.62  It seems that his insights were considered so valuable that he 
became more than a consultant and was involved in discussions with senior LCS staff committees 
concerning operational policy and plans. The recently released documents illuminate his links with at 
least three political deception operations by 1951: the Genocide plot; a scheme to exacerbate splits 
in the Soviet politburo; and the Antonov plot. All appear to have been the responsibility of the 
‘House Party’ committee – which comprised staff from the LCS and SIS. Each plot remains somewhat 
mysterious, with only fragmentary details released in the documentary record. But examining these 
fragments offers an interesting insight into how Tokaev was used and how British deceptions 
worked early in the Cold War.  
Over 1949 and 1950 the House Party committee met at Shell Mex House and at the SLC’s 
headquarters at 2 Ryder Street, where they planned and implemented a number of schemes with 
the core objective of deterring Soviet adventurism or aggression. Some of these deceptions were 
based on more standard deterrent principles, such as possessing superior weapons or the ability to 
deny territory. One notable example involved a fictitious ‘death-ray’ ‘super weapon’ that would 
irradiate Soviet troops amassing at choke points.63 Tokaev became involved with the committee 
soon after its creation – certainly by February 1949, but probably earlier.64 It saw him as an asset. 
Indeed as it developed its early plans House Party even mused as to the opportunities he and any 
future defectors might present to foment trouble in the USSR: 
‘A further step to this at a later date, could be the procurement of a defector, who when 
safely lodged in this country, could be persuaded to give out, such as Tokaev has done, that 
when he left Russia, he was fully conscious of the fact that there was dissention in whatever 
field we decided it should be.’65 
But its primary concern in February 1949 was to appraise Tokaev’s insights into Soviet strategic 
fears, the fragility of the Soviet political order, and to begin to consider operations designed to 
exploit these factors with the objective of gaining a degree of deterrence through undermining 
Soviet confidence in the loyalty or reliability of sections of their population. Indeed, the committee 
decided to move away from the more ambitious ‘super weapon’ schemes soon after their 
conception and concentrate on political deceptions. 
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It started with a concept: ‘that the Soviets might react in a manner that suited British interests if 
they could be persuaded that they had problem with internal dissent.’66 And this objective was 
formalised in February 1949 in plan House Party. The core assumption of the plan was that the mass 
of the Soviet population was a victim of Soviet oppression, ‘held down by force’ and the security 
apparatus under the control of the Politburo. The only way the Soviet empire could achieve its 
economic and military objectives was by compelling the people to implement the will of those in 
supreme authority. In the event of war, people would be compelled to fight. Therefore, should there 
be doubt in the minds of Soviet leaders about their ability to bend their people to their will there  
might be a delay in Soviet economic and military development, the spread of Soviet propaganda, 
and even committing the USSR to war.  
As the LCS explained, ‘the object of the plan can be described as follows: 
To aim at forcing “The Kremlin” to digress from their present aim of spreading Russian 
Communism, by creating such suspicions in their minds concerning disaffection within 
Russia, that it will cause them to divert a substantial amount of attention from their 
expansionist plans to internal reorganisation.” 
The reason for adopting this object is, it is suggested, that any internal disaffection and 
especially amongst those entrusted to enforce the will of the Government, is probably the 
Politburo’s main fear. We are not out to influence the Russian people, the  aim is to force the 
Kremlin to alter their present plans by creating in their minds such a feeling of uneasiness, 
that further progress outside Russia must be retarded, and the result might be a purge in 
Russia or some other major readjustment of their internal organisation, any of which would 
amount to delay, which is so much to our advantage.’67 
The House Party committee weighed the ‘Pros and Cons of the plan’ as follows. The disadvantages 
were that such plans could lead to the exposure of genuine resistance movements; that it could ‘at 
worst’ provoke the Soviets to go to war earlier because they felt their grip on the nation was 
weakening; that the plan would take some time before any results materialised; and it would require 
a large staff and cost a ‘substantial sum of money’. The advantages were that it ‘might provoke a 
purge in Russia against certain sections of the internal organisation’; it might ‘compel concentration 
on Russian internal affairs at the expense of their expansionist plans outside Russ ia; that it might 
slow down the progress of the five year plan; that it might deter them from waging war, or at least 
cause a postponement; the plan could be ‘pursued without the knowledge of British government 
circles. (Foreign Office);’ if successful it would be undetected, and could be kept alive and followed 
up; and that it could lead to confusion within the Politburo at a time when Stalin’s succession 
appeared imminent.’68 Content, apparently, that the pros outweighed the cons and the plan might 
play a role in deterring the Soviets from foreign aggression, House Party resolved to start planning, 
and one of their early steps was to send Tokaev a questionnaire concerning the strength of the 
Soviet Union. It requested detail on the weakest links in the country, the most unstable member of 
the Politburo, who in the armed forces was under suspicion, who were the trusted ambassadors, 
whether or not there was a Russian resistance movement, whether or not there was any anxiety 
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over the satellites, the MVD or the MGB, and ‘where would a “plot” against the Kremlin most likely 
come from’?69 
Tokaev briefed John Drew, Director of the deception machinery after 1950, ‘Biffy’ Dunderdale, and 
other senior members of the House Party committee on Soviet strategic anxieties four days later, on 
22 February 1949. He considered the matter to be complex and resolved to give the committee 
more details later. Nevertheless, his initial judgement was that the ‘southern region in the area of 
the Caspian Sea was a very vulnerable part of their perimeter defence’. He believed the populous 
there was very fearful of Soviet authority, more aware of the outside world, and might react if the 
right revolutionary stimulus was introduced.70 An effective plan would have to appear as indigenous, 
and would probably need to exploit the inherent suspicion of the Caucasian people towards their 
Moscow rulers. He noted that propaganda was listened to, but had a small effect because of the 
general ignorance of the population. But manipulating literature could be effective ways to stir 
resentment. A possible line of attack could be targeting the authority of Stalin, for instance by 
publicising that his book, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, which was essentially the manual for 
every Soviet citizen, had not been written by Stalin (‘Out of 350 pages, 26 were written by Stalin, and 
these were so illiterate, that had to be re-drafted’). House Party concurred that all deceptions 
needed to appear as though they were indigenous, but were wary of pursuing plots that would 
prompt a purge of the Soviet people. This, it judged, ‘would therefore act adversely ultimately 
against any Russian resistance that might otherwise back outside help.’71 It knew that if it proceeded 
and implemented the plan, it must tread carefully. It resolved to meet Tokaev again in March to 
discuss the matter further. 
In the interim, the committee gave Dunderdale more precise instructions about what they needed 
from Tokaev to aid their plans. They needed specifics: names of regime figures whom they should 
target; an assessment of which politburo faction was most vulnerable; whether or not it would be 
possible to drive a wedge between the armed services and the politburo; whether it  was the 
politburo or the services that would ultimately take the USSR to war; whether or not the Soviet 
Academies could be used as channels for deceptive information. 72 Tokaev was given about three 
days to dwell on it, and on 3 March briefed to the committee. He did so with characteristic drama – 
the kind that made many people wary of accepting his information at face value – with an express 
request that his contribution be kept of the utmost secrecy, and with a stark warning that Britain 
should be vigilant against Soviet attempts to send false defectors pedalling misleading information 
to the West. The minutes note his exhortation: ‘He warned… In fact, we could trust EXCISE but 
should be very careful with all others. EXCISE contrasted himself with KRAVCHENKO. KRAVCHENKO 
had chosen personal freedom: EXCISE had defected in order to fight for the freedom of Russia.’ 73  
But he also offered specific recommendations. One recommendation concerned a rift in the Soviet 
Politburo. This was a weakness that might be exploited. He went on to explain to House Party that 
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there was discord ‘amounting to a serious rift between two main factions.’ One faction was the 
Malenkov and Mikoyan faction, which Stalin was party to. These were, according to Tokaev, 
‘(relative) moderates and idealists, who believe that the World Communist State should come about 
by revolutions.’ The second faction was led by Molotov. This faction was far more aggressive, had 
considerable support in the armed forces and believed ‘in a policy of “conquer first and communise 
afterwards”.’ Stalin was having difficulty in managing Molotov, but the Malenkov faction was on 
good terms with Beria, then head of the MGB and the NVD.74 The root of the rift was dissent over a 
decision taken in February 1943 for the ‘liquidation’ of several autonomous national groups in the 
USSR. Over 1.8 million people were affected. Malenkov and Mikoyan had refused to sign their 
approval for the operations citing fear for the ill-feeling it would cause, concern over collective 
punishment, and the possible fallout should the story become public knowledge. 75 Tokaev went on 
to supply the committee with a more detailed analysis of which peoples had been affected, and 
noted that he would be ‘very glad to meet representatives of the press…’ to discuss the matter 
further and to counter the Soviet official pronouncements on the matter which downplayed the 
deportations and the killing very significantly, referring only to two areas that had been affected.76 
Tokaev and the LCS proceeded to discuss how best to use his insights to achieve British objectives. 
The LCS judged that there were at least two opportunities identifiable in the situation, one 
concerning the deportations and the genocide, the other related more directly to the politburo split. 
Regarding the first aspect, they discussed drawing the public’s attention to the deportations as a 
way to exploit the event. The LCS considered that it could discredit the Soviet leaders internationally, 
and that it could sow discord within the Politburo (‘the Malenkov group would be in a “told you so” 
position’) and weaken the regime.77 Indeed, events in the United Nations would bear out this point 
soon after their discussion with Tokaev. The Soviets were attacked for their record on forced labour 
and their refusal to publish statistics and found it difficult to counter the charges with anything other 
than accusations of their own. Foreign Office officials seem to have enjoyed putting their Soviet 
counterparts on the spot and encouraged the IRD to continue producing material on the subjects. 78  
The LCS, meanwhile, considered – and probably agreed with – Tokaev’s view that, ideally, the story 
(and any deceptive embellishments) sould be seen to have their origin from outside the West (and 
Israel, which would, apparently, have been a distasteful origin of the story from a Caucasian 
perspective).79 But some also sounded a note of caution. There could be little doubt that there was 
considerable anger in the USSR concerning the treatment of the regions, and therefore considerable 
potential for exploitation. But the question of whether or not Tokaev, himself a Caucasian, was a 
neutral enough observer lingered. The committee resolved to consider what SIS and the Foreign 
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Office made of the situation, and to consult Tokaev on the best means of implementing any plan 
that they devised.80  
The discussion of the second possible operation drew upon a wider range of expertise. House Party 
consulted the Foreign Office for its views on the developments in the Politburo; (‘Sir Maurice 
Peterson’s remarks concerning Marshal Stalin’s efforts to maintain a balance between Molotov and 
Mikoyan, were noted with interest.’)81 The Committee concluded that an ongoing ministerial 
reshuffle in Moscow was consistent with the rift, but may not be directly linked, and that ‘any 
success which might be achieved in an attempt to discredit Vishinsky or Gromyko (who appear to be 
Molotov men) would probably redound [sic] to our advantage.’ 82 These two could be tarred through 
a variety of means, including ‘deliberate leakages through tapped telephones’, ‘deliberately insecure 
coded telegrams’.83 Obviously, ‘if any “framing” were to be done, a great deal of detailed 
information concerning biographies, private habits etc, of the individuals would be required’.84  
House Party once again turned to Tokaev before coming to a determination about how best to 
exploit the Politburo split. He briefed several SIS and LCS officers on his interpretation of 
developments in Moscow. He judged that Stalin had strengthened his own position and that 
Molotov was ‘definitely on the down grade’. And that further evidence of this might soon become 
visible by observing the fortunes of a Molotov, the President of the RSFSR Soviet, Radinov, who had 
been appointed in 1946 against Stalin’s wishes. His fate might serve as a barometer, Tokaev judged , 
as Stalin might act relatively cautiously in removing his competitors on the Politburo lest it reveal the 
scale of the rift.85 Tokaev supplemented this assessment with more background information on the 
cause of the rift, explaining how Mikoyan had alienated himself from his colleagues. He related an 
event from August 1947 where Mikoyan has isolated himself from Malenkov and Zhdanov ove r the 
creation of the COMINFORM; and another where Mikoyan fell out with his colleagues over the 
decision not to invite the Finish Communist party to be represented on the COMINFORM. Mikoyan 
had also, apparently, spoke out in favour of accepting Marshall aid from the US. He had not been 
purged because of support from other Politburo members, principally Stalin. Based upon all of this, 
Tokaev judged that Mikoyan ‘was our most promising ally within the Politburo…’ .86  
These insights formed the basis of the LCS’s discussions on how to use the ‘deportation’ story to 
exacerbate the rift in the politburo and ‘generally embarrass’ the Soviet regime.  It requested that 
Tokaev ‘should prepare a paper giving in tabulated form his suggestions of action which should be 
taken, and his estimate of likely reactions by the other side’.87 Tokaev complied; his report remains 
retained from the relevant files. But there is no doubt that he continued to advise the committee on 
the significance of various developments in the Politburo: he sent the Committee notes concerning 
his analyses of the fortunes of A. A. Andreev, Voznesenski, Molotov, Mikoyan, Andreev, and Vasili 
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Stalin over the following month.88 Tokaev, the mercurial defector, appears to have been one of the 
primary consultants on Soviet matters to the LCS.  
House Party met again to discuss the Politburo rift and ‘the weapon’ deception plans late in March 
1949. They discussed the intelligence on various Kremlin figures who had been conspicuous by their 
absence recently, such as Vishinsky; they discussed, and agreed with, the British Ambassador’s 
reports from Moscow and his opinion that Molotov had suffered a setback; and dwelt on the lack of 
information about developments in Moscow and whether or not Stalin had reasserted his authority. 
This final point was crucial to their deliberations of whether or not to proceed with any plans to 
exploit any splits in the politburo.89 The committee had very little supplementary information that 
could support their deliberations on implementing Tokaev’s scheme.   Given their relative ignorance 
of developments in the Kremlin, many members of the committee believed that continuing with an 
operation exploiting cracks in the politburo was very problematic. This was a sign of things to come 
for the LCS: the lack of contemporary, deep insight into the Soviet political and military machine 
would bedevil the British deception planners for years to come.  
Nevertheless, Sir Brian Mountain, Chairman of House Party, urged the committee to proceed with 
planning operations based on the mass deportations, which could have an impact whatever the 
state of Politburo unity. To this end they discussed Tokaev’s plan and concluded that ‘it had certain 
obvious weaknesses, but though it was not the ideal instrument for opening a campaign, it would be 
a useful subsidiary implement.’90 The main weakness, in Col. Wild’s judgement, was that it proposed 
an attack from the outside, rather to ferment trouble from within.91 (This is curious given Tokaev’s 
previous insistence that any operation must appear indigenous, but coming to a final judgement is 
difficult without access to the document.) However, the committee retained their faith in Tokaev. 
Wild proposed that they adopt another operation, ‘the Antonov project’ , and the defector remained 
crucial to this new, more targeted scheme. This became plan 1; the genocide and deportations plan 
became plan 2.  
The rapid evolution of these plans suggest several things about the nature of the LCS at this point. It 
clearly remained a flexible and nimble organisation. It was able to integrate new information, 
change course as required, and appears to have retained positive working relationships with sister 
departments, such as the IRD, whilst doing so. They also retained an aggressive instinct, believing 
that deception was a viable tool in blunting the Soviet offensive. The experience of the Second 
World War and the legacy of creativity and boldness no doubt contributed to this. But the speed at 
which the LCS had to adjust and fettle its operations underlined the degree to which it was operating 
in very unfamiliar territory, struggling to apply the lessons of the war to a new situation to which 
they often were not suited. The great deceptions that had worked so well against the Nazis proved 
very difficult to replicate without the required level of insight, feedback, and the right channels. 
Targeting the Soviets required stepping back, designing more precise operations, and learning how 
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they would react to any stimulus. Tokaev’s great utility in these early days was to give the required 
to support the learning process.  
Plan 1, the Antonov plan, was in several senses a step back to the drawing board to gauge what type 
of operation was viable. It involved sowing discord by framing a Soviet officer.92 Antonov had a 
history of subversive activity but had survived ‘through the betrayal of some of his comrades’.93 
House Party believed that if the MGB took possession of incriminating materials ‘a chain reaction of 
purge could be started within the General Staff of the Soviet Army, which if skilfully encouraged 
from without, might involve very important personalities, and cause the regime very serious 
embarrassment.’94 Tokaev was, in House Party’s view, crucial for the ‘framing’ of Antonov. They 
explained that:  
This ‘encouragement’ could be supplied by [redacted, but highly likely to be ‘Tokaev’ whose 
name, but not codename, is consistently redacted in the file] giving to the press, after news 
of Antonov’s purge had leaked out, information incriminating other prominent Soviet 
citizens at present unsuspected by the MGB. The MGB would certainly follow this up, and 
finding Excise’s charges well founded, would be the more receptive to his further 
revelations. At a suitable moment the genocide or deportation story would be brought into 
play.95 
The committee created a planning team, comprising Wild, Drew, Kirby, and probably Dunderdale 
(although the name remains redacted), and ordered that this team would have access to the 
mysterious Mr Chelley, ‘and refer to Excise, as required’.96 They would produce a plan, subject to Sir 
Stuart Menzies’, then Chief of SIS, or ‘C’, approval – and do so promptly, as Tokaev was required by 
the Foreign Office and the IRD to help with their propaganda efforts by writing a pamphlet 
concerning living conditions in the Caucuses, and in the areas of the USSR bordering the Middle East. 
The IRD planned to translate and distribute the pamphlet in the relevant areas. House Party 
determined that ‘the deportation story should play its part in the House Party plan before being 
“blown” as routine propaganda.’97 The chairman, Brian Mountain, concluded the meeting by noting 
‘that whether or not we achieved our main object of disrupting the Politburo, we could not fail to 
score some points, and we should therefore fire ahead’.98 
The working party did indeed fire ahead. By 11 April they produced a plan, the objective of which 
was ‘to shake the confidence of the Soviet leaders by convincing them that a powerful subversive 
movement was well established.’99 They did so in an environment of some confusion over the power 
struggles in the politburo. Tokaev judged that Molotov was out of favour; an unnamed individual 
thought otherwise, and won the argument. It was also unclear whether or not their proposed plot 
could endanger any genuine resistance networks, although Tokaev was certain they would not. 
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Conversely, he was optimistic about the potential positive outcomes of the operation. The most 
likely victims would be Antonov’s close associates, some of whom were in relat ively senior positions, 
and the risk they faced might prompt them to defect. ‘This in itself, even if the plan were not entirely 
successful, would be a very high dividend’.100 
The committee agreed, and adopted the plan. It decided seeks ‘C’s’ to approval as soon as possible – 
apparently telling the Foreign Office as little as possible in the process – and, pending approval of 
the plan in full, to secure his permission for preliminary ‘build-up’ radio operations. It also 
considered the requirements for implementation in general. The first element was the requirement 
for a specialist radio operator whose job would be to broadcast the ‘build -up’ material concerning 
Antonov. The ideal candidate for this role appears to have been a Soviet Naval telegraphist who had 
deserted and was in the custody of British authorities in Germany. 101 His broadcasts were highly 
likely to reach Soviet ears and attention, the committee considered; after all, the ‘Soviet monitor 
service was very comprehensive’.102 The second factor was a technical issue that had to be resolved 
for the premise of the story to remain credible. This was the correct placement of the broadcast 
station. The proximity of US listening posts in the UK made it an undesirable base, and the potential 
for Soviet direction finding to undermine the plan meant that the consultation and advice of 
technical experts was crucial. The third factor concerned the details of the story framing Antonov. 
This remained the responsibility of the planning team, but principally Mr Chelley who would work 
with the help of Tokaev.103  
The precise nature of how the plan proceeded thereafter is unclear, and will remain so until more 
documents are released. Several factors suggest that it did indeed gain ‘C’s’ approval, and was 
subsequently implemented. The first of these is a reference to the plan in a letter from the LCS’s Col. 
Wilt to MI5’s Guy Liddell, to which he attaches several notes concerning ongoing deception 
operations, including ‘Plan 1: Antonov’.104 The second is a note from Tokaev, dated almost a year 
later on 1 April 1950, stating that he attached ‘very great importance to the fact that Army General 
Antonov has appeared in Georgia….’105 He goes on to chide the LCS for not having implemented their 
operation quickly enough: ‘I am very much afraid that again you did not act quickly enough in the 
matter of ANTONOV. It is another example showing that ordinary methods are not applicable in 
matters relating to the USSR. Speed and decision are essential if results are to be achieved.’ 106 The 
third is a note from February 1951 detailing a conversation between Wild, Tokaev and Chelly, where 
they discuss the continuing political turmoil in the USSR, including the Leningrad purges, Stalin’s 
interview with Pravda, unrest in the Caucuses, Baku, and in the Middle Volga region.107 An 
interesting component of the discussions concerns the discussions concerning an individual 
codenamed IVLEV, who Tokaev considered to be a prominent opposition figure in Moscow ‘known 
to the MVD as one of the few who have access to the secret telephone system’, but who they have 
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not been able to identify.108 Tokaev believed that he was probably a member of the Central 
Committee, and suggested that his name could be used to authenticate a series of radio messages 
tied to an operation codenamed FLITTER.  
It is likely that FLITTER is the codename for the operations designed to discredit members of the 
Soviet establishment, and to create the impression of an underground resistance movement in the 
USSR.109 By February 1951, they were in their ninth series – a series appearing to last about 14 days 
– and based on Tokaev’s advice the latest messages would contain ‘For Ivlev. Instructions received. 
Am awaiting new orders’. And ‘Where is Andryanov. Kozyol in contact with Ivlev, but act carefully.’110 
Based on Tokaev’s advice they would also target the secretary of the Baku central committee, 
Bagirov. He was, by all accounts, disliked locally. Tokaev suggested that, first, rumours be spread 
that he was responsible for a series of purges that had taken place since 1948, bringing him into 
disrepute with the local population. And, second, that links be created between troubles in 
Leningrad and instability in Baku, to draw the attention of the MVD. This could then be exacerbated 
by some strategic pamphleteering, the content of which Tokaev would draft. FLITTER remains 
mysterious, the files retained, but the available evidence suggests that the defector’s input was 
extremely valuable in designing what appears to have been a long term deception project, an 
offshoot of Plan 1, the Antonov plan, designed to encourage the Soviets to focus internally. 
Plan 1, the Antonov plan, and its possible subsequent development into FLITTER suggest that Tokaev 
remained valuable to the LCS for a number of years, possibly up to 1953 or even 1955 – a significant 
period beyond the point SIS believed his value exhausted. They were not the sole plans to which he 
contributed. The files contain details of his contributions to at least three more. One relates to the 
aforementioned tussle between Tokaev and the Soviet Embassy in Britain that occurred in the pages 
of the Sunday Express. The LCS aimed to exploit it in order to ascertain the Soviets’ true motives  and 
hit back, noting that whatever ‘the cause and purpose of these “incidents”, the correspondence with 
the Sunday Express provides a welcome opportunity for retaliation of some sort.’ 111 Tokaev penned 
a robust letter in response, attempting to draw more information out of the Soviets. Another 
operation concerns the exploitation of the USSR’s history of mass deportation and genocides. The 
detail is sparse, but Tokaev appears to have been consulted on the British government’s attempts to 
maximise the propaganda impact of these events.112 Yet another political operation is tangentially 
referred to in a letter between the LCS and Maurice Dean.113 And his opinion continued to be sought 
on matters beyond operational detail. He remained a consultant on developments in Soviet politics 
and security affairs.114 Many considered his inputs rather prejudiced as time wore on, and became 
increasingly reluctant to take them at face value. But he also provided more specific detailed 
information that may have facilitated other operations. One example of this is his detailed 
description of political developments and sentiments, military, security and intelligence facilities in 
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Dzaudzhikau (present day Vladikavkaz).115 Tokaev also remained busy supporting the IRD during this 
period. Indeed, throughout 1950 he encouraged the IRD and the LCS to take a more  aggressive 
stance in their propaganda against the Soviet Union.116 
 
Conclusion: Grigori Tokaev, the London Controlling Section, Cold War defectors 
and deception 
Defectors have proven extremely valuable to the West throughout the Cold War and beyond: from 
Tokaev’s significant, although flawed insights into the Soviet strategic programme and to Gouzenko’s 
revelations concerning Soviet espionage in Canada and the United States in the 1940s, on to 
Gordievsky and Mitrokhin in the 1980s and 1990s. Such was the secrecy of the USSR that the West 
was often, even generally, restricted to observing it from the outside in with high technology. The 
defector could offer the view from the inside, and often prompted significant changes in the West’s 
understanding or rhetoric.117 MI5 noted in 1948 that ‘defectors had been, in fact, a major if not the 
Chief source of our knowledge of the Russian Intelligence Service, and in the absence of other 
sources they are likely to be so for some time to come.’118 They were correct. But defectors also 
come with considerable baggage, could generate diplomatic incidents, and generate a difficult 
counter-intelligence problem for the receiving service. The case of Tokaev shows the difficulties of 
effectively managing defectors very clearly, but also the opportunities.  
What does the new evidence tell us about Tokaev; what does it tell us about Cold War deception? It 
confirms that Tokaev was a significant defector at a significant time. British agencies lacked 
information and insight about Soviet capabilities and intentions at a time of considerable strategic 
change. Tokaev could offer perspectives on a variety of issues, technological and scientific, political 
and military. He was therefore of great interest to a number of British policy, intelligence and 
propaganda departments. The new documents reveal a new perspective on his work,  however: the 
fact that he worked closely with one of Britain’s most secretive organisations. He worked with the 
LCS as a consultant, but was also involved in operational planning. They utilised his knowledge of 
Soviet personnel, strategic anxiety, and security culture to plan and implement political deceptions 
with the objective of deterring the Soviets from adventurism in Western Europe. His involvement 
with the deception organisation appears to have continued for longer than his involvement with 
other British intelligence agencies. Indeed, Tokaev was utilised more widely and for longer than has 
previously been considered. There is nothing to challenge the assessment that his information on 
Soviet strategic technology was useful in some cases, but misleading in others.  There is much to 
confirm that SIS, the IRD, the Foreign Office, and the LCS considered him very useful, and that they 
could cooperate well in ‘sharing’ him for their various requirements, but that they also found him  
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rather difficult to manage on occasion, both in terms of his personal arrangements and in terms of 
distilling his political analysis for fact, hearsay, and embellishments.  
The history of Tokaev and the LCS casts a little more light on several aspects of Britain’s deception 
operations during the early Cold War. It underlines the worry in Whitehall regarding the 
development of Soviet strategic strength and their ideological offensive in the face of relative British 
weakness. It illustrates that some considered deception a valuable tool that could be used to redress 
the balance and achieve a measure of deterrence, years before Britain has its own nuclear 
weapon.119 Tokaev’s involvement with the LCS also reminds us that planning and implementing 
deception operations against the USSR was a very difficult task in the late 1940s. The successes of 
the Second World War had taught the British several valuable lessons about the craft, but a key 
element of these lessons was that deceptions needed to be attuned with the target’s belief system 
and therefore based on good intelligence. Successful operations needed to be largely based on what 
the target already believed to be true, and to exploit their preconceptions.120 Because of good 
intelligence the allies understood the Nazi regime. But the Soviet security state had been remarkably 
successful in controlling political and military information, in restricting the movement of its people, 
and in preventing defectors. (Indeed, when it came to pen a study on defectors and their motives in 
1948, the Security Service could only list 20 major defections from the USSR since 1927. 121) Despite 
the difficulties they faced in managing him, Tokaev could offer the deception organisation a small 
element of the advantage they had in designing their great wartime deceptions, a fragment of what 
made the Soviets tick. He gave the LCS a glimpse behind the iron curtain, and was therefore a 
valuable asset to the organisation as it attempted to deter and unsettle Stalin’s Soviet Union.  
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